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Abstract. The industrial processes and systems have become more sophisticat-
ed and also adopted in diverse areas of human activities. The Industrial Control 
System (ICS) or Internet of Things (IoT) have become essential for our daily 
life, and therefore vital for contemporary society. These systems are often in-
cluded in Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) which is crucial for each 
state. Consequently, the cyber defense is and will be one of the most important 
security field for our society. Therefore, we use the novelty detection approach 
in order to identify anomalies which can be a symptom of the cyber-attack in 
ICS environment. To achieve the main goal of the article One-Class Support 
Vector Machine (OCSVM) algorithm was used. Moreover, the anomaly detec-
tion algorithm is adjusted via multi-criteria evaluation and classifier fusion. 
Keywords: Cyber Security, Novelty detection, Anomaly Detection, Industrial 
Control systems, Multi-Criteria Evaluation. 
1 Introduction 
Emerging development in information and communication technology (ICT) caused 
critical changes in understanding of the ICT nature. Therefore, increasing intercon-
nection, interdependencies, and complexity of the ICT resulted in increasing of effec-
tiveness in a considerable number of human activities. On the other hand, this devel-
opment is accompanied by new cyber threats which can result in global crisis. The 
newly formed "global cyber organism" has become much more vulnerable to sophis-
ticated malware which analogic to a global human population in case of biologic vi-
ruses. The rapid development in ICT has an eminent influence on recently isolated 
industrial control systems (ICS) which are vital for our society. Therefore, ICS cyber 
security has been subject to fundamental changes which resulted in reconfiguration of 
"status quo". Furthermore, the malware Stuxnet was the main milestone in ICS cyber 
security which the led to necessary changes in cyber security. 
ICS is developed in order to control of industrial processes. Moreover, according to 
"Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security" [1] we can divide ICS into two 
main subgroups. The first is geographically independent Supervisory Control and 
Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, and the second is a geographically dependent 
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system known as Distributed Control System (DCS). [2] The boundary between these 
systems is often relatively insufficiently defined, which leads to the mutual misinter-
pretation of the groups. However, a considerable number of experts use the terminol-
ogy SCADA instead of DCS. This misinterpretation occurs frequently and therefore is 
mostly acceptable by the experts. 
The detection of cyber-attacks is one of the crucial factors of cyber security or 
cyber defense. Moreover, there is a considerable number of cyber security solution 
which can be adapted in case of ICS. However, one of the most progressive method 
how to defense ICS is anomaly based detection. Therefore, we are focusing on cyber 
defense system based on anomaly detection algorithms which can be easily adopted 
for intrusion detection systems (IDS). The anomaly detection involves the problem of 
finding patterns in a dataset that do not match the expected behavior. Moreover, every 
anomaly can be a symptom of the cyber-attacks. [3] Thus, the there are three main 
subgroups: Supervised anomaly detection, Semi-supervised anomaly detection, and 
Unsupervised anomaly detection which are based on differently structured datasets. 
This distribution is supported by a considerable number of authors [3], [4], [5], [6], 
[7], [8]. Taking into account the importance of various input data is crucial for every 
anomaly detection system. However, the anomaly detection systems have been de-
ployed in various fields of human activities. Akoglu et al. (2015) [9] investigated the 
areas in which are anomaly detection system often used. We can highlight some of 
them: medical problems, image processing, insurance fraud, data center monitoring, 
image/video surveillance, etc. [9]  
Stouffer et al. (2015) [1] pointed to historical developments in ICS where systems 
and devices are often used more than 20 years. In addition, a considerable number of 
ICS systems had been developed before private networks and the Internet deployment 
that we know today. However, these commonly used technologies are now intercon-
nected with ICS which led to the creation of new vulnerabilities. Moreover, it is evi-
denced by an increasing number of vulnerabilities which are reported to ICS-CERT 
(753% in recent years). Pollet (2013) [10] predicted increasing interdependencies 
between ICS and ICT, and therefore the percentage of industrial companies providing 
the IDS for ICS will continually grow. Horkan (2015) [11] concluded that the IDS 
going to be an essential part of the ICS systems in following years. The application of 
IDS in ICS environment was examined by a considerable number of researchers: 
Verba a Milvich (2008) [12], Zhu a Sastry (2012) [13], Yang et al. (2013) [14], Mag-
laras a Jiang (2014) [15]. Moreover, Maglaras a Jiang (2014) [15] investigated the 
possibility of the OCSVM deployment in ICS environment. Unfortunately, the au-
thors did not cover how they set Gamma parameter for OCSVM in deep. Further-
more, the computational cost of anomaly detection system was not considered. 
On this basis, we established Semi-supervised anomaly detection system also 
known as Novelty detection. We carried out a multistep procedure in order to achieve 
the objectives of the research, and therefore obtain reliable as well as low computa-
tional cost of anomaly detection system. Moreover, presented predicted model is 
modified according to multi-criteria evaluation where we take into account computa-
tional cost. 
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The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section II is focused on a description 
of anomalies. Classification algorithm used in the research is analyzed in Section III. 
Section IV gives a necessary insight into methods which were used in the research. 
The Sections V includes results. Finally, Section VI provides the conclusion of the 
article. 
2 Anomaly as a symptom of cyber-attack 
Anomaly detection is a progressive method to find and separate patterns that deviate 
from normal behavior. Computer intrusion includes hacking, viruses, computer 
worms etc. However, the intrusion represents only a small percentage of total network 
and computer capacity. [16] Anomalies are relatively rare events in computer systems 
or networks, which can be divided into two main groups. The first group is anomalies 
caused by intentional human activities that involve cyber-attacks. The second group 
included anomalies that were caused by unintentional human activity (poor handling 
of the cybernetic system) or natural disasters and mistakes caused by technical error, 
lack of technical equipment or unintended human action.  
According to E. Knapp (2011) [17] we can distinguish ICS anomalies into four 
main groups. The first group includes the monitoring of network traffic which in-
cludes source and destination Internet Protocol (IP) address, TCP/UDP ports, traffic 
volume etc.. The second groups can be characterized as a user activity which includes 
logins and logoffs of the users and other user activities. The third main group of 
monitored system behavior is Process and Control behavior which is also subject to 
this article. Moreover, this specific group is focused on system behavior which in-
volves configuration of the system. Finally, the last group is focused on event and 
incident activity and handling, monitoring criticality, total number and severity of the 
incidents etc. [17] 
3 Support Vector Machine 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is one best-suited classification algorithm for wide 
range applications. It is also an exceptional choice for high dimensional data and non-
linear separation. Moreover, SVM is considered as a straightforward solution for 
anomaly detection system based on unbalanced dataset. All the advantages of the 
SVM are needed to build reliable detection system in multidimensional space for a 
nonlinear dataset. The predictive model is built on SVM. It classify the data into one 
of the predefined class. Moreover, the OCSVM is usually used for binary classifica-
tion cases which are classified as +1 or -1.  The SVM creates the widest margin near 
the boundary between two sets of data.  
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Fig. 1. The SVM boundary with margins. 
The Fig. 1 illustrates how SVM algorithm operates with boundary. The circles and 
asterisks represent two classes in two-dimensional space. Each data point is repre-
sented by (?̅?, 𝑦) where ?̅? are feature values and y is a label (asterisk, circle or -1, 1). 
Moreover, the boundary is calculated in order to maximize the margin space. [18] The 
boundary is calculated according to equation (1).   
𝑓(?̅?) = ?̅??̅? + 𝑏  (1) 
The main boundary is also known as hyperplane which is defined as ?̅??̅? + 𝑏 = 0 and 
the margin width is defined as max
2
‖𝑤‖
. According to gutter constraint, we can set the 
margins on +1 and -1. The relationship is represented by equation as ?̅??̅?𝑖 + 𝑏 = 𝑦𝑖 , 
where ?̅?𝑖 ∈ {−1, +1}. The OCSVM algorithm solves dual optimization problem in 
order to optimize constrained system.  The final function can be seen in (2). [18] 
𝐿(𝛼) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝛼𝑗𝐾(𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗
𝑛
𝑖  (2) 
Where 0 ≤ 𝛼𝑖 ≤
1
𝜈𝑚
 and ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑛
𝑖 = 1. Moreover, αi is a Lagrange multiplier, ν is a 
trade-off parameter, m represents the total number of datapoints in a training dataset 
and K(xi, xj) is a kernel function which is dot product in higher dimensional space. 
[18] There is a necessity to separate the dataset. However, the separation of the da-
tasets are computational demanding process in most cases. The solution for this prob-
lem is the transformation of data into higher dimensional space. Thus, the kernel func-
tion K is described by the equation (3). 
𝐾(𝑥𝑖 , 𝑥𝑗) = (∅(𝑥𝑖), ∅(𝑥𝑗)) (3) 
There are four commonly used kernels (Linear kernel, Polynomial kernel, Radial 
Basis Function (RBF) and Sigmoid kernel). However, we decided to use RBF which 
is suitable for the purpose of the research. Moreover, the kernel nonlinearly maps 
samples into a higher dimensional space. [19] Where γ represents Gamma parameter. 
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𝐾(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−𝛾‖𝑥𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗‖
2
) ,   𝛾 > 0 (4) 
3.1 Gamma parameter 
Gamma (γ) is the main parameters for nonlinear RBF also for SVM. The predictive 
model is set up for the best suited boundary in order to maximize space between mar-
gins. However, the shortage of the approach is the misclassification which can lead to 
poorly assembled predictive model. Therefore, Cortes and Vapnik (1995) [18] devel-
oped soft margins which allow to change or excluded data points for the purpose of 
minimize the number of errors. Gamma is the parameter of the nonlinear classifica-
tion due to RBF kernel. Moreover, this parameter is a trade-off between error due to 
bias and variance of the predictive model. Therefore, there are two main problems, a 
problem of overfitting of the model and the boundary does not correspond with the 
complexity of data. 
4 Methods 
The purpose of the article is to create time efficient and accurate detection system in 
ICS environment. The OCSVM with RBF kernel is used in order to fulfill the main 
goal of the article and therefore develop a confidential predictive model. However, a 
considerable number of ICS devices which have limited computational power due to 
their long life cycle. Therefore, every anomaly detection system has to take into ac-
count requirements for computational power. Additionally, we can conclude that 
computational power is increasing due to growing Gamma value. Hence, there must 
be the specific equilibrium between the detection capabilities and computational 
complexity. The multi-criteria evaluation is one of the possible ways how to establish 
accurate and low computational cost detection system. The multi-criteria evaluation is 
based on the reference point of the multiple criteria (Accuracy, Sensitivity, Specifici-
ty, Precision, False Positive Rate (FPR) and Time). 
 Accuracy - It represents the correct classification of the model. Moreo-
ver, accuracy is calculated as correct classification divided by correct and 
incorrect classification. 
 Sensitivity - Sensitivity is also known as recall or true positive rate. 
Moreover, it is based on true positive condition and predicted positive 
condition. The criterion expresses how much relevant results are re-
trieved by the predictive model. 
 Specificity - Specificity is also known as True negative rate. This criteri-
on represents the measure of how correctly the negatives examples are 
classified. 
 Precision - The criterion is also known as positive predictive value, takes 
into account true positive value and false positive value. The precision 
gives us information about how many relevant and irrelevant results give 
us the predictive model. 
6 
 FPR - This criterion is commonly known as false alarm rate. The predic-
tive model improperly identifies normal harmless behavior as an anomaly 
which may lead to disruption of ICS. Therefore, FPR is highly important 
for critical infrastructure because the availability of the services is the 
most important criterion for ICS. 
 Time - Time represents necessary time period for creation and evaluation 
of the predictive model. 
 
The predictive model is based the Mississippi State University and Oak Ridge Na-
tional Laboratory SCADA dataset.[20] The dataset consisting of 37 power system 
event scenarios. The dataset is structured as follow natural events (8), no events (1) 
and attack events (28). Normal operation of the system is represented by "no events". 
The "natural events" can be characterized as a natural fault of the system. The "attack 
events" can be described as the system under the cyber-attack. Furthermore, four In-
telligent Electronic Devices (IED) were monitored. We investigated cyber-attack 
type: Data injection.  
5 Results 
Preprocessed dataset is divided into four subsets which representing data for each 
IED. We created seven hundred and fifty predictive models for each subset and dif-
ferent value of gamma parameter in order to evaluate the detection system. Moreover, 
the criteria for each predictive model are calculated (Accuracy, Sensitivity, Specifici-
ty, Precision, FPR and Time). The best fitting value of gamma parameter is deter-
mined by multi-criteria evaluation (reference point). Moreover, the weight for each 
criterion is selected according to its priority for ICS system. Therefore, we established 
three groups. The first and least important group include Accuracy and Sensitivity due 
to their focus only on positive classification. The second group includes Specificity, 
Precision and Time. The first two criteria which partially involving false positive 
identification, and time to build the predictive model which is very important for ICS. 
The last group involving false positive rate as the most important criterion due to the 
possible availability disruption of the ICS. 
  
Fig. 2. The results for the first IED. 
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The Fig. 2 shows the results for Accuracy, Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision, False 
Positive Rate (FPR) and Time for the first IED. The results decompose in the interval: 
Accuracy from 0.832 to 0.967, Sensitivity from 0.819 to 1, Specificity from 0.382 to 
0,941, Precision from 0.931 to 0.992, FPR from 0.008 to 0.069 and Time from 6.279 
to 19.997 ms. Moreover, the best outcomes for each criterion according to gamma 
parameter is calculated as follow: Accuracy - 0.232 gamma, Sensitivity - 0.232 gam-
ma, Specificity - 0.002 gamma, Precision - 0.008 gamma, FPR - 0.008 gamma and 
Time - 0.008 gamma. 
 
Fig. 3. The results for the second IED. 
The graphs in Fig. 3 represents the results for the second IED. The results decompose 
in the interval: Accuracy from 0.859 to 0.975, Sensitivity from 0.849 to 1, Specificity 
from 0.338 to 0.941, Precision from 0.927 to 0.992, FPR from 0.008 to 0.073 and 
Time from 5.092 to 19.236 ms. The gamma parameter for the best outputs is as fol-
low: Accuracy - 0.124 gamma, Sensitivity - 0.124 gamma, Specificity - 0.002 gamma, 
Precision - 0.006 gamma, FPR - 0.006 gamma and Time - 0.026 gamma. 
 
 
Fig. 4. The results for the third IED. 
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The Fig. 4 shows the results for the third IED which are decomposed in the interval: 
Accuracy from 0.863 to 0.947, Sensitivity from 0.854 to 0.979, Specificity from 0.515 
to 0,941, Precision from 0.944 to 0.992, FPR from 0.056 to 0.008 and Time from 
6.374 to 16.881 ms. The gamma parameter for the best outputs of the criteria is as 
follow: Accuracy - 0.116 gamma, Sensitivity - 0.814 gamma, Specificity - 0.002 
gamma, Precision - 0.008 gamma, FPR - 0.008 gamma and Time - 0.008 gamma. 
 
Fig. 5. The results for the fourth IED 
The last results are shown in Fig. 5. The results for each criterion is spread as follow: 
Accuracy from 0.884 to 0.964, Sensitivity from 0.877 to 1, Specificity from 0.485 to 
0,941, Precision from 0.942 to 0.992, FPR from 0.008 to 0.058 and Time from 4.954 
to 12.758 ms. The gamma parameter for the best outputs of each criterion is as follow: 
Accuracy - 0.25 gamma, Sensitivity - 0.266 gamma, Specificity - 0.002 gamma, Pre-
cision - 0.004 gamma, FPR - 0.004 gamma and Time - 0.01 gamma. 
Table 1. The overall results for the computed gamma parameters 
 Accuracy Sensitivity Specificity Precision FPR Time (ms) Gamma 
IED 1 0.892 0.891 0.897 0.986 0.014 6.491 0.01 
IED 2 0.906 0.905 0.912 0.989 0.012 5.235 0.014 
IED 3 0.898 0.893 0.941 0.992 0.008 6.374 0.008 
IED 4 0.901 0.9 0.911 0.988 0.012 5.179 0.012 
 
In Tab. 1 can be seen all values for selected criteria according to chosen Gamma pa-
rameter. The parameter Gamma was computed for each IED according to the Refer-
ence point. Moreover, it calculates the best choice for each criterion and compares it 
to the actual state of the criteria according to their weights. At the end of the multi-
step procedure, the results are fused into one via Majority vote technique. The final 
results affected by fusion are as follows: Accuracy - 0.898, Sensitivity - 0.888, Speci-
ficity - 0.985, Precision - 0.998, FPR - 0.002. 
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6 Discussions 
The presented paper is focused on improvement of detection capabilities of predictive 
models via choosing an appropriate value of the Gamma parameter. The Gamma pa-
rameter is one of the determining parameters for Radial kernel of the SVM. We estab-
lished novelty detection system based on one-class SVM. Moreover, four IED under 
cyber-attack were used in order to create and evaluate the proposed solution. Fur-
thermore, seven hundred and fifty predictive models with a different value of Gamma 
parameter were used. 
The results presented in figures 2, 3, 4, 5 are assigned to four IED. The overall re-
sults indicate relatively high values for Accuracy, Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision 
and low values for FPR and Time especially for the low value of Gamma parameter. 
Moreover, the progress of graphs for is similar within a group of IED. The most sig-
nificant results are situated in the first quarter of each graph (Fig. 2. Fig. 3, Fig. 4, Fig. 
5) as result of high FPR and Time parameter in the rest of the data. Therefore, it is 
important to note that every miscalculation of Gamma parameter could have the seri-
ous impact on ICS. All relevant criteria achieve relatively high values in case of Ac-
curacy, Sensitivity, Specificity, Precision and contrary FPR, Time criteria achieve 
considerably low values. The results for all predictive models show the best results 
for the relatively low value of Gamma parameter. Thus, proposed system based on 
multi-criteria evaluation calculated low values of Gamma parameter (0.01, 0.014, 
0.008, 0.012). Moreover, the classifier fusion of the subsets resulted in improvement 
of detection capabilities of the detection system, especially for FPR parameter. 
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